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I. INTRODUCTION
"And the king said, Divide the living child in two, and give half to one, and half to
the other. ,'
Since King Solomon was called upon to render the most famous child custody
decision, the courts across the nation have seen an endless flow of child custody
litigation either as separate lawsuits or as part of a divorce ending a marriage to
which children were born. The context of this multifaceted issue may range widely
from two natural parents battling over who has the right to rear their child, to com-
plex lawsuits involving such issues as grandparent rights,2 rights to an illegitimate
* J. Randall Patterson, B.A. The Citadel; J.D. with special distinction, Mississippi College, formerly associated
with the law firm of Watkins Ludlam & Stennis, in Jackson, Mississippi, is a sole practitioner in Waynesville,
North Carolina where he practices general litigation and family law. Mr. Patterson is a member of the Family
Law Section of the American Bar Association, and is a member of the Mississippi and North Carolina State Bars.
1. 1 Kings 3:25.
2. See infra notes 120-128, 148-155 and accompanying text.
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child,3 the rights of a homosexual parent,4 or domestic abuse.' While each child
custody case will present certain novel issues, all such cases will share certain pro-
cedures and considerations that form the core of any custody lawsuit or lawsuit
which determines the custody rights to a child .6
II. NONMARRIED PARENTS
When an illegitimate child is born, that child has only one legally recognized
parent, its mother, who has an absolute right to custody of the child. When at a
later time, the child is either legitimized7 or an order of filiation is entered, the
putative father is elevated to an equal position with the mother. It is a long estab-
lished principle that both parents have an equal right to the custody of their minor
children. "The father and mother shall have equal powers and rights, and neither
parent has any right paramount to the right of the other concerning the custody of
the minor or the control of the services or earnings of such minor, or any other
matter affecting the minor."' The crucial factor bestowing any custody rights at all
upon the father of an illegitimate child is that he be legally recognized as the child's
father.
In Mississippi, Sections 93-9-1 through 93-9-75 of the Code' provide statutory
authority for most actions to establish paternity in that state. Under Section 93-9-
910 "[p]aternity may be determined upon the petition of the mother, the child, or
any public authority chargeable by law with the support of the child."" The pur-
pose and application of this law, since, by negative implication excludes the puta-
tive father as a plaintiff, is to provide a mechanism through which irresponsible or
uncooperative fathers can be forced to support their illegitimate children.' 2 Most
jurisdictions have adopted some similar statutory law.13
A quirk of law in Mississippi, however, is that if the putative father desires to
have himself adjudicated as the legal father of an illegitimate child, thereby be-
stowing parental rights to the child, he may do so individually under the authority
3. See infra notes 7-8, 137-46 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 104-08, 128-33, 152-54 and accompanying text; see also Steve Susoeff, Comment, Assess-
ing Children's Best Interests When a Parent is Gay or Lesbian: Toward a Rational Custody Standard, 32 UCLA L.
REv. 852 (1985); Michael P. Sullivan, Annotation, Parent's Transexuality os a Factor in Award of Custody of Chil-
dren, Visitation Rights, or Termination of Parental Rights, 59 A.L.R. 4th 1170 (1988); Wanda Ellen Wakefield,
Annotation, Initial Award or Denial of Child Custody to Homosexual or Lesbian Parent, 6 A.L.R. 4th 1297
(1981).
5. Randall A. Buty, Comment, Lawyering for the Abused Child: "You Can't Go Home Again", 29 UCLA L.
REv. 1216 (1982).
6. It is of some import to note that Mississippi law on child custody is derived from several distinct sources
that include statutes, divorce case law, child support or modification case law, and of course child custody law.
7. "An illegitimate child shall become a legitimate child of the natural father if the natural father marries the
natural mother and acknowledges the child." Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-1(2) (Supp. 1991).
8. Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-13-1 (1972).
9. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 93-9-1 through 93-9-75 (1972 & Supp. 1991).
10. Mss. CODE ANN. § 93-9-1 (Supp. 1991).
11. Id.
12. Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-9-7 (1972).




of Section 93-11-65,1" or in the capacity of the next friend of the child under the
authority of Section 93-9-9 of the Mississippi Code.15
It is also of some import that actions brought pursuant to Section 93-11-65 are
subject to a general statute of limitations of three years,16 which begins to run at
the time of the child's birth. Actions filed pursuant to Section 93-9-9 may be com-
menced at any time prior to the child's eighteenth birthday.17 Additionally, the
Mississippi Supreme Court has held that the doctrine of laches cannot be applied
to a paternity action brought on behalf of the child.18
In order to apply laches in the case sub judice, the Court would have to find that an
eight-year-old child was negligent in not previously anticipating her needs for educa-
tion and maintenance. . . .To allow this would mean "depriv[ing] the child of that
support which belongs to him [or her] for reasons over which the child has no con-
trol" ... [and] would frustrate the legislature's intent expressed through its "Uni-
form Law on Paternity."'
9
Mississippi courts further do not bind the child by a determination of paternity
adjudicated as part of a divorce to which the child was not a party.2" As such, if
there is a question of paternity, a child, although presumed legitimate due to his
birth to a married woman who has since divorced, may individually file suit
against the putative father at some later date.2
Interstate paternity actions are becoming more common, and are largely con-
trolled by the availability of personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Such juris-
diction may vary to some extent, but must conform to constitutional requirements.
In the recent case of Jones v. Chandler,2 the putative father had been residing in
Mississippi as a college student when the child was conceived.23 When the mother
later filed a paternity suit, the Mississippi court held that it had personal jurisdic-
tion over the putative father even though he had since relocated to Tennessee.2"
The court attributed this personal jurisdiction to, the "begetting act" which it
found had occurred within the State of Mississippi.2"
We find the statutory and common law sources adequate that we may, in a paternity
and support action, declare this state's law to hold amenable to suit here a non-resi-
14. "Proceedings may be brought by or against a resident or nonresident of the State of Mississippi, whether or
not having the actual custody of minor children, for the purpose of judicially determining the legal custody of a
child." Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-11-65 (Supp. 1991).
15. Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-9-9 (Supp. 1991). See Vronsky v. Presley, 526 So. 2d 518 (Miss. 1988); Williams
v. Williams, 503 So. 2d 249 (Miss. 1987); Grimsley v. Tyner, 454 So. 2d 482 (Miss. 1984).
16. Miss. CODE ANN. § 15-1-49 (Supp. 199 1). See also Johnson v. Ladner, 563 So. 2d 1368 (Miss. 1990).
17. Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-9-9 (Supp. 1991).
18. McGlaston v. Cook, 576 So. 2d 1268 (Miss. 1991).
19. Id. at 1269 (quoting Wilson v. Wilson, 464 So. 2d 496, 499 (Miss. 1985)).
20. Baker v. Williams, 503 So. 2d 249, 254 (Miss. 1987).
21. Id.
22. 592 So. 2d966 (Miss. 1991).
23. Id. at 968.
24. Id. at 972.
25. Id.
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dent who, in this state, together with a resident of this state, begets a child that there-
after resides here without support from his putative father.2 6
As a result of the Jones holding, if the child is conceived outside of the state and
the father is a non-resident, even if the mother and child are residents, Mississippi
does not have jurisdiction over the putative father. Such situations must be dealt
with under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support laws (hereinafter
"URESA") .27
III. ESSENTIALS OF A CONTESTED CUSTODY CASE
A. Initial Client Interview
The first meeting with a prospective client in contested child custody litigation
is extremely important in that during that interview, the attorney must assess the
merits of the case and determine whether to accept the client's case. During this
meeting, the attorney should listen carefully to all aspects of the client's back-
ground information, and special care should be taken to identify all potential
strengths and weaknesses of the client's position. Additionally, it is important to
inquire into the client's personal history and to identify any potential "skeletons in
the closet" that might be used against the client at trial. Undoubtedly, if your client
has a tainted past, the other side will know about it, and use it.
It is extremely important that at this first meeting fees be discussed openly with
the client. Child custody litigation, if properly conducted, can be expensive, and
the client should understand this on the front end. Specific expenses that should be
addressed are discovery costs, expert witness fees, and attorney's fees. Addition-
ally, billing policies should be explained in detail. If the client indicates an inten-
tion or inclination to unreasonably restrict discovery or the use of experts because
of expense, it must be explained that these are usually crucial to a successful judg-
ment in child custody litigation. If the client persists in such restrictions prior to
accepting the representation, this client should be required to sign a waiver indica-
ting that he or she understands the importance of experts in custody lawsuits and
that by their choice, and against the advice of counsel, the lawsuit will be con-
ducted under specified restrictions. When the client fully understands potential
expenses and fees, an engagement letter should be utilized to reflect that under-
standing and the scope of the representation.
B. Case Background
To adequately prepare for successful child custody litigation it is crucial that an
attorney have thorough and realistic appraisals of the client, the opponent, and the
child. In that information gleaned from client interviews is usually biased, addi-
tional information must be sought. An excellent source of such information is the
myriad of lay witnesses who have had routine contact with the parties or with the
26. Id.
27. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 93-11-1 through 93-11-63 (1972 & Supp. 1991).
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child. Such potential witnesses may include neighbors, church leaders, friends, or
teachers. Teachers are a particularly valuable source of information in that they
can not only convey their observations of the child and family, but can also provide
input as to the child's academic performance or any changes in the child's social
interaction. "Particular attention should be paid to reports of emotional instability,
nail biting, incorrigibility, poor grades, tardiness and absences and the reasons
therefore, and any sudden shift in the qualitative or quantitative aspects of any of
the foregoing factors."28 Household employees or neighbors can also be a valuable
source of information on issues such as the conduct of the custodial parent or on
how the child is cared for or disciplined. All such witnesses should be interviewed
as early as possible.
An interview with the child who is the subject of the dispute is also important to
the formulation of a successful case plan. The child should be questioned not only
about his or her perception of each of the parties, but also about daily life or rou-
tines, and about his or her preference of custodial parent. The Mississippi Code
provides:
[I]f the court shall find that both parties are fit and proper persons to have custody of
the children, and that either party is able to adequately provide for the care and main-
tenance of the children, and that it would be to the best interest and welfare of the
children, and any such child who shall have reached his twelfth birthday shall have
the privilege of choosing the parent with whom he shall live.
29
While the statute clearly gives the child the right to state a preference, the court
may apply its discretion to determine if that choice is within the best interests of
that particular child. The Mississippi Supreme Court, however, in Polk v. Polk30
held that "when the chancellor denies a child his choice of custodial parent under §
93-11-65, then the chancellor must make on-the-record findings as to why the
best interest of the child is not served."3 It is important, therefore, not only to as-
certain the child's preference, but also to identify the reasons for that preference so
that the choice can either be bolstered or discredited at trial.
Another source of information that should not be overlooked is police records.
These should be reviewed not only for indications of misconduct by the parties,
but also for past misconduct by persons known to have routine exposure to the
child through the parents. Such examination could reasonably produce facts that
could be used to discredit the opponent, or that could make their life-style or
choices seem adverse to the interests of the child.
If the family has used the services of a social worker at any time, those records
should also be reviewed. It is likely that the social worker will be hesitant to re-
lease the records without a court order. In such circumstances, a subpoena duces
tecum should be utilized. Additionally, medical records of the parties and of the
28. RICHARD E. CROUCH, FAMILY LAW CHECKLISTS § 10-9 (1990).
29. Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-11-65 (Supp. 1991).
30. 589 So. 2d 123 (Miss. 1991).
31. Id. at 130.
1992]
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children may provide relevant information. The question of privilege for such re-
cords, must be addressed on a case-by-case basis by the court.
C. Discovery
With a thorough case background, a discovery plan should be formulated and
implemented in every child custody case. A request for admissions is a valuable
mechanism through which the opponent can be confronted with, and required to
respond to, accusations of misconduct or neglect of the child.
Written interrogatories propounded pursuant to the Mississippi Rules of Civil
Procedure32 may also provide general information about the opponent or home life
and identify potential issues for examination during deposition. In preparing the
questions, it is important to remember that the questions will most likely be an-
swered with the assistance of counsel. Additionally, interrogatories are extremely
important in that they may be used to ascertain the identity and anticipated testi-
mony of expert witnesses the opposing side will use at trial. In Schepens v. Sche-
pens,33 the Mississippi Supreme Court vacated a chancellor's custody award due to
the mother's lack of opportunity to prepare for and respond to an adverse expert
witness.3 4 The prevailing party had answered the mother's interrogatories identi-
fying the expert only four days before trial, and the mother was denied a continu-
ance that she requested for the purpose of additional preparation." The court held
that her inability to adequately respond to this surprise witness was grounds for the
initial award to be vacated and the case remanded for additional testimony on the
best interests of the children.36 Questions designed to "pin down" the opponent are
better saved for deposition where the response will be more spontaneous.
Depositions, although more expensive to use than interrogatories, are excellent
discovery devices which may be used to gain information from parties and non-
parties alike.37 This information may be invaluable in trial preparation and, since
the deposition is conducted under oath, may serve as a basis for the impeachment
of the witness during the trial. Additionally, if for some reason a witness is later
unavailable and, therefore, unable to testify at trial, the deposition testimony may
be read into the record as evidence.38 Deposition testimony should be taken as
early as possible in the proceedings. This will provide an early information base
and will likely avoid some of the hostility that will probably escalate as the lawsuit
continues.
32. Miss. R. Civ. P. 33.
33. 592 So. 2d 108 (Miss. 1991).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 110.
37. Miss. R. Civ. P. 30.
38. Miss. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
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D. Trial or Hearing
In most jurisdictions there is no right to ajury trial in child custody litigation; it
will be tried by a chancellor or judge sitting alone.39 Courtroom theatrics should
be avoided in such lawsuits, and the evidence should be presented in such a way as
to emphasize not only your client's position, but an overall interest in the child's
welfare. One novel way to illuminate your client as the preferred parent for custody
is through an "A Day in the Life of" video. Such a film should reflect normal daily
activities and should emphasize a stable home environment.
The order of witnesses should be planned in such a way as to support or intro-
duce the prior or subsequent witness. Additionally, the most powerful testimony
should be presented first and last. The first testimony the judge hears will make an
impression and create an expectation of what is to follow. The final witness is the
last impression before a decision is made, so that testimony also should be strong.
In any contested custody case, regardless of the jurisdiction, there is a myriad
of uses for expert testimony.
The custody case provides fruitful ground for the use of experts, since not only pro-
fessionals -such as doctors, psychologists, psychiatrists, teachers, social workers
and members of the clergy -but also neighbors, friends, and relatives, because of
their being parents, can qualify as experts and testify as to who should have custody.
Therefore, the pool of lay experts from which counsel can draw is virtually limitless,
and he should make full use of this opportunity in building his case. These non-pro-
fessional witnesses can not only render opinions as experts, but can also usually sup-
ply at least some of the facts on which their opinions are based. Such testimony will
provide the nucleus on which counsel's case is based.40
These experts are extremely important in custody litigation and will generally
be utilized by both sides to bolster their position and to discredit the opposing
side's expert. In such cases it has been held that a judge or chancellor may use his
discretion with regard to the probative value of such expert testimony.41 In Tor-
rence v. Moore,42 the chancellor discounted the testimony of the mother's expert, a
clinical psychologist, and against the psychologist's recommendations, awarded
custody to the father.43 In affirming the custody award, the Mississippi Supreme
Court held:
It cannot be said that the chancellor is in error because he refused to substitute his
judgment as to the best interests of the child with the judgment of the professional
39. In the minority jurisdictions of Texas and Georgia, however, a contested child custody lawsuit may be
tried before ajury. See Rodrigues v. Cohen, 377 N.W.2d 321, 328 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985); Davis v. Davis, 115
So. 2d 355 (La. 1959); Mandel v. Mandel, 439 N.Y.S.2d 576 (1981).
40. Edward J. Winter, Jr. & Brian R. Hersh, Child Custody Litigation, 22 Am. JUR. TRIALS 347, 392 (1975).
41. See, e.g., Torrence v. Moore, 455 So. 2d 778 (Miss. 1984).
42. 455 So. 2d 778 (Miss. 1984).
43. Id.
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witness. The ultimate determination of the best interests of the child is a determina-
tion to be made by the court.4
In its review of Torrence, the court further restated the principle that a chancellor's
findings of fact in a custody lawsuit would not be disturbed on appeal unless mani-
festly wrong .4' Generally, the standard of review in the appeal of a trial court's de-
46cision in a contested child custody case is abuse of discretion.
When examining your expert, avoid stipulation as to his or her qualifications
and establish them on direct. To properly establish foundation, question the expert
as to: academic training, medical training, specialty training, specialty certifica-
tion, publications, years in practice, years in specialty, and previous experience as
an expert witness. On further direct examination, it is important to establish the
amount of time he has spent with the child or parties or reviewing records in for-
mulating his conclusion. With this foundation set, it is then appropriate to question
the expert as to his or her conclusions and his or her basis for those conclusions.
In the cross-examination of an adverse expert, the obvious goal is to discredit
the qualifications and/or opinion of that witness. If discovery indicates a weak
area, thoroughly question the adverse expert on his qualifications or lack thereof.
If discovery indicates impressive credentials, stipulate as to the adverse expert's
qualifications. There is no reason to recite an impressive resume to the trier of
fact. Cross-examination of the adverse expert should additionally attempt to iden-
tify any bias that the expert might personally harbor. Further cross-examination
should explore the expert's actual opportunity to observe the child or the parties.
If, for example, the expert failed to meet with your client, an obvious lack of basis
for his opinion is present. If the adverse witness used any tests as the basis for his
conclusions, attempt to bring the validity of the results into question. Appropriate
areas of inquiry of this end would include the health of the child on the date the test
was administered, reuse of a test that had been previously used with the child, or
any deviations from the protocol of the test during its administration.
Professional experts may additionally be useful in cases in which physical abuse
of the child is alleged. One novel and extremely accurate method of proving physi-
cal abuse is through the use of ultraviolet photography of the abuse sites on the
child.47 This advanced process, coupled with close scrutiny of bruise patterns," is
a means through which visual photographs of the child's abuse may be brought be-
fore the trier of fact. The impact of such evidence is most certainly much greater
than that from oral testimony.
44. Id. at 780. See also Pace v. Owens, 511 So. 2d 489 (Miss. 1987); Cheek v. Ricker, 431 So. 2d 1139 (Miss.
1983).
45. Id. See also Nichols v. Tedder, 547 So. 2d 766 (Miss. 1989); Devereaux v. Devereaux, 493 So. 2d 1310
(Miss. 1986); Carr v. Carr, 480 So. 2d 1120 (Miss. 1985).
46. Newsome v. Newsome, 256 S.E.2d 849 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979); Adams v. Adams, 59 S.E.2d 366 (Ga.
1950); Finnegan v. Finnegan, 58 S.E.2d 594 (W. Va. 1950).
47. Michael West & Robert Barsley, Ultraviolet Forensic Imaging, FBI LAw ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN (May
1992), at 14.
48. See William Jungbluth, Knuckle Print Identification, 39 J. FoRENsic IDENT. 375 (1989).
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While examining witnesses, use all of the available tools of evidence. Use note-
books or diaries to refresh the memory of witnesses, or to discredit an opposing
witness.49 Additionally, in custody cases, the character of the parties is always at
issue. Use reputation" and evidence of personal habits" to reflect your client's su-
perior interest in the well-being of the child. If your client has "skeletons in the
closet" that could not be eliminated before trial, bring those issues out on direct
examination so that you can control the manner in which the negative information
is presented to the court. If the "skeletons" are there, the other side will bring them
out. By doing it on your terms, through a friendly witness, you can likely down-
play the effect of the negative information and mitigate the adverse facts. If the
"skeleton" is one that can be eliminated before trial, such as a live-in friend, elimi-
nate it, and then address that issue on direct examination. This corrected circum-
stance can actually be used favorably as an illustration of the client's concern for
the best interests of the child, and your client's willingness to make life-style ad-
justments in the interest of the child.
The fragile issues of character and reputation are often where much emphasis
must be placed in trial to show why one parent should be granted custody over the
other. As counsel targets these subjects, care should be taken not to engage in a
game of "character-assassination" with the other side. It is perhaps a more effec-
tive strategy to recognize some of the opposing parent's good qualities, but then
prove why your client is better suited to have custody. If the opposing parent is at-
tacked too harshly, it may appear to the court as a power game, rather than litiga-
tion arising from a concern for the child's interest.
Generally, in a contested custody suit, it will be necessary to use the child who
is the subject of the litigation as a witness. The law in Mississippi has traditionally
given complete discretion to the trial judge as to whether to allow the child to tes-
tify in court proceedings. The competency or incompetency of children to testify
is largely an issue within the sound discretion of the trial judge. 2 Before allowing
the testimony of a child, however, "the trial judge 'should satisfy himself that the
child has the ability to perceive and remember events, to understand and answer
questions intelligently, and to comprehend and accept the importance of truthful-
ness.' "53
In Jethrow v. Jethrow, 4 the court, while voicing a general disapproval with the
practice of calling children as witnesses, recognized a right of the parties to do so
in divorce proceedings .5 The court, however, left the chancellors with great dis-
cretion as to whether the testimony should be allowed. In its opinion, the court
49. Miss. R. EvIn. 612.
50. Miss. R. EVID. 405.
51. Miss. R. EvID. 406.
52. Wilson v. State, 221 So. 2d 100, 102 (Miss. 1969).
53. Jethrow v. Jethrow, 571 So. 2d 270, 272 (Miss. 1990) (quoting House v. State, 445 So. 2d 815 (Miss.
1984)).
54. 571 So. 2d 270 (Miss. 1990).
55. Id. at 274.
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adopted the factors from the child custody case of Crownover v. Crownover 6 as the
inquiry to be made by trial judges in their analysis of whether or not to exclude the
child witness. The court held that the chancellor should consider: (1) the compe-
tency of the child to testify; 7 (2) whether the court has "[taken] great pains. . . to
conduct an in camera conference with the child to determine the competency of the
child, as well as the competency of any evidence which the child might present;" 8
and (3) "whether the best interests of the child would be served by permitting her
to testify or be sheltered from testifying and being subjected to a vigorous cross
examination." 9 Additionally, the court required that the trial judge formulate a re-
port of his findings to be made part of the record.6"
A report of the essential material matters developed at the in camera conference
should be made of record by the trial court and the court should state the reasons for
allowing or disallowing the testimony of the child, and also note the factual informa-
tion which the court developed from the conference with the child which would be
considered by the court in its ultimate determinations in the case.61
The Jethrow court, after delineating the procedure by which the trial courts
should consider the proposed testimony of a child concluded, "[w]e trust the
Chancellors of our state. . . that in dealing with. . . cases which come through
their courts that they will continue to look after the child's own best interest before
permitting him to get on the witness stand."62 Thus, while recognizing the right of
a party to call a child as a witness, the court reiterated the chancellor's discretion
and control of how that right may be exercised.
The closing statement should be succinct and should again highlight your cli-
ent's positive attributes and the stability that he or she can provide for the child.
Again the emphasis should be on how custody with your client is in the child's best
interest rather than on what a bad person the opposing parent is.
E. Judgment and Other Considerations
When the trial court renders judgment, care must be taken in drafting the order
to specifically address each relevant issue of the custody dispute. Some jurisdic-
tions have mandatory language or provisions that must be included in custody or-
ders. Such provisions generally require that each party provide the other with an
address or telephone number or may require notice to the court of changes in resi-
dence status." Further, the order should include provisions for the support of the
child, insurance coverage, and the visitation of the non-custodial parent. If there is
56. 337 N.E.2d 56 (111. 1975).
57. Jethrow v. Jethrow, 571 So. 2d 270 (Miss. 1990). The courts have traditionally used the test established
by House v. State, 445 So. 2d 815 (Miss. 1984) to determine the competency of a child witness.
58. 571 So. 2d at 273 (quoting Crownover v. Crownover, 337 N.E.2d 56, 59 (11. 1975)).
59. Id.
60.Id. at 273.
61. Id. at 273-74.
62. 571 So. 2d at 274.
63. See Miss. UNIF. CHANCERY CoURT RuLE 8.06.
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any question as to who will claim the child as a tax exemption, the order should
address that. Additionally, if the non-custodial parent is to claim any of the chil-
dren for tax purposes, the custodial parent should execute an IRS Form 8332. The
Form 8332 is a waiver of exemption and it may be made for any specific year, or
for all future years. This form must be attached to all income tax returns when the
non-custodial parent claims a child as an exemption. Upon the conclusion of the
case and entry of judgment, the client should be made to understand that a child
custody award is always subject to modification.64
E The Legal Standard
1. Jurisdiction and Venue
Pursuant to a jurisdiction's venue statute,65 initial custody proceedings brought
as part of an action for divorce should generally be filed in the county in which the
defendant resides, or in the county in which the parties resided at the time of sepa-
ration, if the plaintiff is still a resident of that county at the time of filing.66 If the
defendant is a non-resident, the action should be filed in the plaintiffs home
county. The court having jurisdiction in family law matters generally has author-
ity in any divorce to "make all orders touching the care, custody and maintenance
of the children ... ."67 Additionally, pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Ju-
risdiction Act (hereinafter "UCCJA"),68 the chancery or family court maintains
jurisdiction over actions to modify existing custody orders if:
(a) This state (i) is the home state of the child at the time of commencement of the
proceeding, or (ii) had been the child's home state within six (6) months before com-
mencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this state because of his
removal or retention by a person claiming his custody or for other reasons, and a
parent or person acting as parent continues to live in this state; or
(b) It is in the best interest of the child that a court of this state assume jurisdiction
because (i) the child and his parents, or the child and at least one (1) contestant, have
a significant connection with the state, and (ii) there is available in this state substan-
tial evidence concerning the child's present or future care, protection, training and
personal relationships; or
(c) The child is physically present in this state and (i) the child has been abandoned,
or (ii) it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because he has been sub-
jected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse or is otherwise neglected or de-
pendent; or
(d)(i) It appears that no other state would have jurisdiction under prerequisites sub-
stantially in accordance with paragraphs (a), (b) or (c), or another state has declined
to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this state is the more appropriate forum to
64. Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24 (Supp. 1991).
65. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-5-11 (Supp. 1991).
66. Id.
67. Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-5-23 (Supp. 1991).
68. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 93-23-1 through 93-23-47 (Supp. 1991).
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determine the custody of the child, and (ii) it is in the best interest of the child that
this court assume jurisdiction.69
Based on the interests of the child, another state may assume jurisdiction of the
matter upon petition by one of the parties and a showing that the second state is the
more appropriate forum. 7o
2. Custody as Part of a Divorce Proceeding
A court of competent jurisdiction, when hearing an action for divorce may "as
may seem equitable and just, make all orders touching the care, custody and main-
tenance of the children of the marriage . .71 When custody is addressed as part
of a divorce proceeding, it is awarded based upon the "best interests of the child."72
Historically, family law courts have demonstrated little uniformity in custody
awards, and have used the age of the child as the primary consideration in custody
litigation. This "tender years doctrine" has now been generally eliminated as the
sole factor in determining custody issues in most jurisdictions.73 In Albright v. Al-
bright,74 the Mississippi Supreme Court eliminated this doctrine and enumerated
several concrete factual considerations to guide the courts of that state in their de-
termination of the "best interests of the child.""s
Factors to be considered in ascertaining best interest, as stated in Albright, in
addition to age are:
health, and sex of the child; a determination of the parent that has had the continuity
of care prior to the separation; which has the best parenting skills and which has the
willingness and capacity to provide primary child care; the employment of the parent
and responsibilities of that employment; physical and mental health and age of the
parents; emotional ties of parent and child; moral fitness of parents; the home,
school and community record of the child; the preference of the child at the age suf-
ficient to express a preference by law; stability of home environment and employ-
ment of each parent, and other factors relevant to the parent-child relationship. 6
69. Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-23-5(1)(Supp. 1991).
70. See Castleberry v. Castleberry, 541 So. 2d 457 (Miss. 1989).
71. Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-5-23 (Supp. 1991).
72. Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24 (Supp. 1991). See Carr v. Carr, 480 So. 2d 1120 (Miss. 1985); Albright v.
Albright, 437 So. 2d 1003 (Miss. 1973).
73. See Thomas R. Trenker, Annotation, Modern Status of Maternal Preference Rule of Presumption in Child
Custody Cases, 70 A.L.R. 3d 262 (1976). See also COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-124 (Supp. 1991); N.Y. DOM.
REL. LAW § 240 (Supp. 1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.2 (Supp. 1992).
74. 437 So. 2d 1003 (Miss. 1983).




Traditionally, in many states a divorce granted due to marital fault77 would op-
erate to bar an award of alimony or child custody.78 In those early decisions, the
traditional morals imposed by the courts served largely to punish the offending
spouse for his or her marital impropriety. "When a divorce has been properly
granted because of adultery of [a spouse], she is not entitled either to alimony or to
the custody of the children save temporarily as to an infant so young as not to per-
mit separation from its mother. . . . "" It is now, however, firmly established in
many jurisdictions that marital fault on the part of one of the parents does not op-
erate as a bar to that parent being granted custody of the parties' children. In Carr
v. Carr,8" the court recognized that "[iun earlier decisions, custodial law was used
to punish and penalize spouses guilty of marital fault. . . .Generally, courts now
[however] consider the best interest rule, not marital fault, as the primary guide in
custody determinations." 8 The court in Carr, reiterated the Albright factors and
held that "moral fitness is but one factor to be considered, and is a factor worthy of
weight in determining the best interest of the child. "'82
This principle was recently applied in Mississippi in the case of Retzer v. Re-
tzer. 83 In Retzer, the husband was awarded a divorce on the grounds of adultery,
but the wife was awarded custody of their two children." The court, in adjudicat-
ing the best interests of the children, relied extensively on the Albright factors and
held that "[m]arital fault should not be used as a sanction in custody awards.""5
In its review of the trial court's order in Retzer, the Mississippi Supreme Court
held, "[t]his Court is 'bound by those findings unless it can be said with a reason-
able certainty that those findings were manifestly wrong and against the over-
whelming weight of the evidence' ".86 The court found no such manifest error, and
affirmed the chancellor's custody award in spite of marital fault.87
77. See MIss. CODE ANN. § 93-5-1 (1972 & Supp. 1991). (Mississippi statutorily recognizes twelve grounds
of fault for divorce: (1) Natural impotency at the time of marriage; (2) Insanity or idiocy at the time of marriage;
(3) Bigamy; (4) Incest; (5) Pregnancy of wife by another at time of marriage; (6) Adultery; (7) Sentenced to peni-
tentiary; (8) Desertion; (9) Habitual drug usage; (10) Habitual drunkenness; (11) Habitual cruel and inhuman
treatment; (12) Incurable insanity). Id.
78. See Moody v. Moody, 211 So. 2d 842 (Miss. 1968); Anderson v. Watkins, 208 So. 2d 573 (Miss. 1968).
79. Winfield v. Winfield, 35 So. 2d 443,444 (Miss. 1948). See Keyes v. Keyes, 171 So. 2d 489 (Miss. 1965);
Hulett v. Hulett, 119 So. 581 (Miss. 1928).
80. 480 So. 2d 1120 (Miss. 1985).
81. Id. at 1122. See also Yates v. Yates, 284 So. 2d 46 (Miss. 1973).
82. Carr, 480 So. 2d at 1123.
83. 578 So. 2d 580 (Miss. 1990).
84.Id. at 581.
85. Id. at 599.
86. Id. at 600 (quoting Carr v. Carr, 480 So. 2d 1120, 1123 (Miss. 1985)).
87./d. at 596.
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In Polk v. Polk,"8 the court gave judicial interpretation to statutory law89 which
provides for a child to choose between parents in custody suits. While this opinion
acknowledged the discretion of a chancellor in custody awards, it also placed great
weight on the literal language of the statute. "We find that when the Chancellor
denies a child his choice of custodial parent under section 93-11-65, then the
Chancellor must make on-the-record findings as to why the best interest of the
child is not served."" As a result of this holding, special emphasis must be placed
on the testimony and intentions of children, twelve and older, in custody litiga-
tion."
3. Modification of Child Custody
When a court enters an order adjudicating the custody of a child, that court
maintains continuing jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties for the pur-
pose of later modifications of that order.92
In most jurisdictions there is a two tier approach to affect the modification of a
child custody order. Initially, the party seeking modification must show by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that there has been, since the entry of the previous
custody order, a substantial and material change of circumstances adverse to the
interests of the child.9 The court has expressly held that improvements or changes
in the life-style of the noncustodial parent is insufficient to satisfy the first tier of
the test. 4 Additionally, a severe decrease in the personal income of the custodial
parent has been held insufficient to show a material change warranting a modifica-
tion of custody."
Immoral conduct on the part of the custodial parent may, under certain circum-
stances, constitute a substantial change in conditions sufficient to warrant a change
of custody. In Cheek v. Ricker,9" the court considered this issue, and in analogizing
modification litigation to an initial divorce proceeding, held, "if the mother's in-
discretions with another man do not, in a divorce action, constitute aper se barrier
to an award of child custody, it makes no sense that such a barrier should be
88. 589 So. 2d 123 (Miss. 1991).
89. Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-11-65 (Supp. 1991).
Provided, however, that if the court shall find that both parties are fit and proper persons to have custody
of the children, and that either party is able to adequately provide for the care and maintenance of the
children, and that it would be to the best interest and welfare of the children, and any such child who shall
have reached his twelfth birthday shall have the privilege of choosing the parent with whom he shall live.
Id.
90. 589 So. 2dat 130.
91. See Jeff Atkinson, Criteria for Deciding Child Custody in Trial and Appellate Courts, 18 FAM. L. Q. 1
(1984).
92. Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-5-23 (Supp. 1991). See Reynolds v. Riddell, 253 So. 2d 834 (Miss. 1971). See
also, N. SHELTON HAND, JR., MSSisSIPPI DIVORCE, ALIMONY AND CHILD CUSTODY § 20-1 (2nd ed. 1987).
93. Arnold v. Conwill, 562 So. 2d 97 (Miss. 1990); Pace v. Owens, 511 So. 2d 489, 490 (Miss. 1987);
Rutledge v. Rutledge, 487 So. 2d 218, 219 (Miss. 1986).
94. Duran v. Weaver, 495 So. 2d 1355 (Miss. 1986).
95. Robinson v. Robinson, 481 So. 2d 855 (Miss. 1986).
96. 431 So. 2d 1139 (Miss. 1983).
[Vol. 13:109
CHILD CUSTODY LITIGA TION
erected in custody modification proceedings."97 The court, in further explanation
of its holding, opined:
In divorce actions, as distinguished from proceedings for modification of custody,
sexual misconduct on the part of the wife is not per se grounds for denial of custody.
A husband may upon proof of his wife's adultery be granted an absolute divorce on
that grounds and yet in the same case custody of the children may be awarded to the
mother. This is because the test for custody is different from the test to be applied in
determining whether the divorce should be granted. Child custody determinations
are made by reference to the best interest of the child. Our cases well recognize that
it may be in the best interest of a child to remain with its mother even though she may
have been guilty of adultery.98
In Phillips v. Phillips,9 the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed a modification
of custody based solely on the custodial parent's sexual indiscretions. The court
found no adverse effect on the child as a result of the parent's conduct.' 00 As such,
the legal standard for modification of custody was not met. Through its analogy of
a modification proceeding to a divorce custody dispute, the court firmly estab-
lished that improper conduct on the part of the parent, would alone fail to pass
muster as a substantial change adequate to support a petition for modification of
custody.' '
In White v. Thompson,10 2 the natural father and his parents sought a modifica-
tion of custody based primarily on the custodial parent's lesbian relationship with
her roommate. 0 3 In addition to the fact that the mother was a homosexual, the
movants alleged that she had used drugs in the presence of, and had generally ne-
glected the children.' The court affirmed the trial court's modification of cus-
tody which was based upon the mother's "financial situation, her past adulterous
behavior, her marijuana use, and the lesbian relationship."0 5 Although the court
acknowledged multiple factors which could be construed as substantial changes
adverse to the interest of the child, it held that the chancellor "could have relied
almost entirely on [the lesbian relationship] ,"" as a basis for modifying custody.
In reviewing a change in circumstances to satisfy the requirements of the first
tier of the test, the courts must consider all evidence relevant at the time of the ini-
tial order and compare it to all evidence relevant to circumstances at the time of the
motion for modification.0 7 If a sufficient change detrimental to the children's in-
97. Id. at 1144-45.
98. 431 So. 2d at 1145 n.3.
99. 555 So. 2d 698 (Miss. 1989).
100. Id. at 701.
101. Id.
102. 569 So. 2d 1181 (Miss. 1990).
103. Id. at 1182.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1183.
106. Id. at 1184.
107. Smith v. Todd, 464 So. 2d 1155, 1157 (Miss. 1986).
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terest has occurred between those two specific points in time, then the first tier of
the test is satisfied.
Once a movant has overcome the first tier of the standard, the courts must de-
termine what custody arrangement would be in the best interest of the child.108
"The second prerequisite to a modification of child custody is a showing that the
best interest of the child requires the change in custody."" 9 In addressing this is-
sue, the courts again apply the Albright11 factors111 as are used in initial custody
proceedings. If the court is satisfied under the Albright factors that it is in the best
interest of a child that the movant be granted custody, then such a modification
may be ordered.
4. Novel Issues in Custody Litigation
When there is more than one child in a dysfunctional family, the question of
separating the children is certain to arise. The Mississippi Supreme Court ad-
dressed this issue in Sparkman v. Sparkman. 112
This Court has never adopted any per se rule to the effect that children should not be
separated, in the absence of a showing of absolute necessity ,for the child's welfare
.... [However], "[t]he court shall in all cases attempt insofar as possible, to keep
the children together in a family unit. It is well recognized that the love and affection
of a brother and sister. . . is important in the lives of both of them and to deprive
them of the association ordinarily would not be in their best interests.
113
As such, the standard in Mississippi is to keep siblings together absent unique cir-
cumstances.
The Mississippi Supreme Court addressed a novel issue in Mord v. Peters. 114 In
this case, the mother, who had custody, objected to the children flying in a private
airplane with their father during periods of visitation. 11 The court recognized the
importance of the child's relationship with the noncustodial parent and held:
[A]bsent a finding by the court that the non-custodial parent has acted without con-
cern for the child's well-being or best interest, has demonstrated irresponsible con-
108. Newsom v. Newsom, 557 So. 2d 511 (Miss. 1990); Phillips v. Phillips, 555 So. 2d 698 (Miss. 1989).
109. Nesvsom, 557 So. 2d at 516.
110. Albright, 437 So. 2d at 1005.
111. Newsom, 557 So. 2d at 516.
Age should carry no greater weight than other factors to be considered, such as: health, and sex of the
child, a determination of the parent that has had the continuity of care prior to the separation; which has
the best parenting skills and which has the willingness and capacity to provide primary child care; the
employment of the parent and responsibilities of that employment; physical and mental health and age of
the parents; emotional ties of parent and child; moral fitness of parents; the home, school and community
record of the child; the preference of the child at the age sufficient to express a preference by law; stability
of home environment and employment of each parent, and other factors relevant to the parent-child rela-
tionship.
Id. (quoting Albright v. Albright, 437 So. 2d 1003, 1005 (Miss. 1983)).
112. 441 So. 2d 1361 (Miss. 1983).
113. Id. at 1362 (quoting Mixon v. Bullard, 217 So. 2d 28, 30-31 (Miss. 1968)).
114.571 So. 2d 981 (Miss. 1990).
115. Id.
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duct,. or finding that the activity which is questioned by the custodial parent
presents a danger to the child's safety or well-being, neither the custodial parent nor
the court may intervene to restrict activities during visitation. 116
In its holding, the court granted great latitude to the non-custodial parent and
placed significant emphasis on the autonomy of that parent's relationship with the
child.117
Another situation in which the courts have historically recognized the strength
of the parent-child relationship is in third party custody disputes. In the 1955 case
of Hendrix v. Hendrix,118 the paternal grandmother of the child petitioned the
court for custody, alleging abandonment of the child by the parents. 119 The court,
relying on Hibbette v. Baines,12 reversed a trial court order awarding custody to
the grandmother and returned custody of the child to the natural parent. 21 The
principle of law that was dictated by these early cases was applied recently in Bu-
bac v. Boston. '22 In that case, the parents, both in the military, were divorced by a
Kentucky court which awarded joint custody, with the father having physical cus-
tody until such time that the mother could take the children with her. '23 The father
placed the children with his mother who refused to give them up to their mother.'24
The Mississippi court recognized the validity of the Kentucky order and the supe-
rior position of a natural parent's right to custody.125 " 'Simply stated, the natural
parent is entitled to custody, as against a third party, unless one of the [following]
conditions is clearly proved': (1) The parent abandoned the children; (2) The par-
ent's immoral conduct adversely affects the children's interests; or (3) The parent
is unfit to have custody."126 The court found none of these had occurred in Bu-
bac. 1
27
In Nancy S. v. Michele G. 128 several unique theories of custody were advanced,
and subordinated by the court to the paternal rights of the natural parent. In Nancy
S., the parties, who had been long term lesbian lovers, had the plaintiff artificially
inseminated so that they could become parents on two separate occasions.129 After
their relationship dissolved, both asserted parental rights to the two children con-
ceived. 130 The court, relying on the Uniform Parentage Act, 3 defined a parent as
116. Id. at 985 (quoting Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 345 S.E.2d 10, 12 (Va. 1986)).
117. Id. at 983.
118. 83 So. 2d 805 (Miss. 1955).
119. Id. at 805-06.
120. 29 So. 80 (Miss. 1900).
121.83 So. 2d at 810.
122. 600 So. 2d 951 (Miss 1992).
123. Id. at 953.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 952.
126. Id. at 956. See also Rutland v. Pridgen, 493 So. 2d 952 (Miss. 1986).
127. 600 So. 2d 951,956 (Miss. 1992).
128. 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
129. Idat 214.
130. Id.
131. CAL. CIVIL CODE § 7001 (West 1983).
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"one who is the natural or adoptive parent of a child,132 and refused to recognize
the defendant's assertion of parental rights under theories of defacto parenthood,
in loco parentis or parenthood by equitable estoppel. 133
Newmark v. Williams' also recognized the autonomy of the relationship be-
tween parent and child as being superior to any interests asserted by interested
third parties. In that case, the parents who were members of the Christian Science
faith, refused medical treatment for their child who was dying of cancer.3 5 The
Delaware Supreme Court reversed an award of temporary custody to the State
holding "[t]he State's authority to intervene in this case, therefore, cannot out-
weigh the Newmark's parental prerogative and [the child's] inherent right to enjoy
at least a modicum of human dignity in the short time that was left to him." 36
In State in Interest ofJ. WE, 137 the court considered a case in which a man to
whom the natural mother of a child was married but who was not the father of the
child, sought custody.138 The Utah court, while recognizing "the presumption of
legitimacy. . . [absent] reasonable doubt,"1 39 in this particular case due to the in-
compatible racial mix of the child and the lack thereof in the husband, held that the
burden to rebut the presumption of legitimacy had been met. 4 ' The J. WE court
further classified the "birth-husband" as a stepparent, thereby effectively eliminat-
ing any rights that he had to the minor child who had been born during his mar-
riage to the mother.' 4'
Stepparent rights to a child were also the issue in the Alabama case of Shoe-
maker v. Shoemaker. '42 In that case, the mother of the minor child had, in a prop-
erty settlement agreement, agreed to allow the child's then stepfather specified
visitation rights. 43 She later refused visitation, and a contempt action was
brought.'" The court held "the legal severance of the stepparent-natural parent re-
lationship would also sever any legal relationship of the stepparent-stepchild for all
practical purposes. . ,,,'4 and denied the stepfather any visitation rights with the
child. 146
132. 279 Cal. Rptr. at 215.
133. Id. at 219.
134. 588 A.2d 1108 (Del. 1991).
135. Id. at 1109.
136. Id. at 1118. See also Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); In re Cabrera, 552
A.2d 1114 (Pa. 1989); In re D.L.E., 645 P.2d 271 (Colo. 1982).
137. 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990).
138. Id. at 713.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 716.
141. Id.
142. 563 So. 2d 1032 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990).
143. Id. at 1030.
144. Id. at 1033.
145. Id. at 1034.
146. Id.
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There are many cases, however, that have taken custody from the natural par-
ents or upheld an award of custody to a third party. Worley v. Jackson147 is a case in
which the court upheld such a custody award and placed custody of the children
with the paternal grandparents." In Worley, the natural mother of the children
was charged with the murder of the natural father, and was incarcerated. 149 Based
on the mother's inability to care for the children, the court awarded custody to the
children's grandparents. 50 The court did state in its opinion, however, that if the
mother were to be released from prison, that she could seek a modification of cus-
tody back to her. 11 Another case in which the natural parent was divested of cus-
tody, with custody being granted to grandparents is White v. Thompson." 2 In
White, the natural father and his parents jointly filed for a modification of custody
due to the custodial mother's neglect of the children, and her involvement in a ho-
mosexual relationship."5 3 The court affirmed the chancellor's decision that the
mother's life-style was detrimental to the well-being of the children, and awarded
custody to the paternal grandparents.154 In Matter of Marriage of Criqui,'55 the
court affirmed the denial of the natural mother's petition to modify custody back
to her after she had voluntarily relinquished it some years earlier.5 6 The court,
while recognizing the "parental preference doctrine,"5 7 declined to apply it to the
Criqui facts because Mrs. Criqui had executed an agreed order, which had been
entered, transferring custody of her children to the third party. 5 8 It was upon this
vested legal custody in the third party that the court declined to apply the "parental
preference doctrine," applied the best interests of the child test, and left custody
unchanged. 159
The mobility of families in today's society also interjects several unique issues
into child custody disputes. In Bell v. Bell, 6 ' the court addressed one such issue
when it considered whether to recognize an agreement made between the parents,
and incorporated into their divorce decree, providing that neither parent could re-
move the children from the jurisdiction without the consent of the other.' 6' The
147. 595 So. 2d 853 (Miss. 1992).
148. Id. at 855.
149. Id. at 853.
150. Id.
151.Id. at 855.
152. 569 So. 2d 1181 (Miss. 1990).
153. Id. at 1182.
154. Id. at 1185. The White court also determined that the natural father was unsuitable to have custody of the
child for unspecified reasons concerning his financial situation and abuse of alcohol. Id.
155. 798 P.2d 69 (Kan. Ct. App. 1990).
156. Id. at 74.
157. Id. at 71. The "parental preference doctrine" presumes that a natural parent has an absolute right to the
physical custody of their child against a third party with no legal claim to the child, regardless of the benefits to the
child of remaining with the third party. See Christlieb v. Christlieb, 295 P.2d 658 (Kan. 1956).
158. 798 P.2d at 70.
159. 798 P.2d at 73. See also Ex Parte McLendon, 455 So. 2d 863 (Ala. 1984) (holding parental right to child
was secondary to a legal transfer of custody executed by that parent).
160. 572 So. 2d 841 (Miss. 1990).
161. Id. at 843.
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court held the order to be unenforceable.162 "[W]e direct that our chancery courts
refuse to approve any child custody agreement under section 93-5-2 or otherwise
which mandates, without exception, that children be raised in a given commu-
nity." 63 As such, any agreement to restrict the relocation of the custodial parent,
or the child, is against public policy and is void ab initio.164
A problem historically faced by courts, a petition for the modification of a cus-
tody order from another state, has been greatly alleviated by Mississippi's enact-
ment of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (hereinafter "UCCJA").165
UCCJA serves as the statutory authority for Mississippi courts to address, or to
decline to hear, interstate custody cases.166 Further, this act mandates Mississip-
pi's recognition of custody decrees ordered by the courts in another jurisdiction,167
and provides a means by which jurisdiction of the case may be transferred from
one state to another. 
168
It is also of some import that the Mississippi Supreme Court has found the UC-
CJA an inappropriate mechanism through which to enforce the payment of child
support awards. 169 "[Tihe UCCJA expressly excludes from its coverage matters
relating to child support or any other monetary obligations of any person."70
Child support matters are rather under the auspice of the Uniform Reciprocal En-
forcement of Support Act ("URESA").171
IV. SHORT-AND-LONG TERM EFFECTS ON ALL PARTIES
Although the fact-law patterns of child custody disputes are almost always dif-
ferent, a baseline commonality exists in that both the parents and the children in
any such case will suffer some form of emotional trauma as a result of the litiga-
tion. The client should be reminded that although they are no longer spouses, they
both still remain parents and should be encouraged to work together as much as
possible on child rearing issues. Further, the client should be advised to refrain
from making derogatory comments about the other parent to the child. Such verbi-
age accomplishes nothing and will generally lower the child's personal esteem.
The client should additionally be encouraged to keep as much normalcy in the
child's life as possible with regard to school, church, and social activities.
As to the legal consequences of a custody order, the client should be advised
that a custody order is never absolute, and that it can be modified at a later date
162. Id.
163. Id. at 846.
164. Id.
165. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 93-23-1 through 93-23-47 (Supp. 1991).
166. Curtis v. Curtis, 574 So. 2d 24 (Miss. 1990).
167. Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-23-25 (Supp. 1991).
168. Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-23-13 (Supp. 1991).
169. Carpenter v. Allen, 540 So. 2d 1334 (Miss. 1989).
170. Id. at 1336 (Miss. 1989); Miss CODE ANN. § 93-23-3(c) (Supp. 1991); See also Warwick v. Gluck, 751
P.2d 1042 (Kan. 1988); Burrill v. Sturm, 490 So. 2d 6 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986); Lee v. DeShaney, 457 N.E.2d 604
(Ind. Ct. App. 1983); Kloukis v. Kloukis, 440 A.2d 894 (Conn. 1981).
171. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 93-11-19 to 93-11-21 (Supp. 1991).
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upon a showing of a change in circumstances. Additionally, visitation provisions
should be understood, along with the potential consequences for interference with
visitation.
Emotions will generally be charged and hostile between the litigants. An effec-
tive family lawyer must recognize the fine line between legal counselor and social
worker and never cross that line. Often some form of counseling is appropriate to
maintain order and perspective for the parties and children. Such counseling is
generally available at low cost or is covered by most major medical insurance
plans, and clients should be encouraged to use such services.
V. JOINT CUSTODY
In most jurisdictions the award of joint custody in its different variations is con-
trolled by statute.172 In Mississippi, the Code provides specific circumstances un-
der which the chancellor may make certain, types of custody orders.17
Joint custody of a child is generally available as an alternative provided that the
parents of the child were divorced on a no fault ground, and that both parents re-
quest that joint custody be ordered.' 74 Further, most courts have discretion to
award joint custody in other circumstances, "upon application of one (1) or both
parents."' 75 Although a court may exercise its discretion in any custody award if
both parents agree to and seek joint custody, there is a presumption that such cus-
tody is in the best interest of the child. 7 Such an order may be tailored so as to
allow physical and legal custody to both parents jointly,177 physical custody to both
parents with one having legal custody,'78 or legal custody to both parents with one
having physical custody. '79 It is also of some import that the court, when presented
with a request for a joint custody order may at its discretion require one or both
parents "to submit to the court a plan for the implementation of the custody or-
der. ""' In Mississippi, the legislature further anticipated the potential problems in
having ex-spouses share custody, and required as part of any joint custody arrange-
ment that the parents "exchange information concerning the health, education and
welfare of the minor child, and to confer with one another in the exercise of deci-
sion-making rights, responsibilities and authority."' The Mississippi statute ad-
ditionally states that a joint custody order, like any child custody order, may be
modified by appropriate legal action. 
8 2
172. Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24 (Supp. 1991).
173. Id.
174. Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24(2)(Supp. 1991).
175. MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24(3)(Supp. 1991).
176. Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24(4) (Supp. 1991).
177. Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24(1)(a) (Supp. 1991).
178. Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24(1)(b) (Supp. 1991).
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In Torrence v. Moore,'83 the court addressed one problem typically associated
with a joint custody arrangement -instability in the life of the child. The court af-
firmed a modification of custody to only one parent, and "found that the advent of
school age was a material change in circumstances that rendered the split of cus-
tody of the child useless and even harmful to the child." 184
Another situation certain to stress the workability of joint custody is the reloca-
tion of one spouse. The Bell' decision, previously discussed, established judi-
cially that parents could not, in anticipation of this problem, contract to rear the
child in a specific community. 18 6 The geography of child rearing was also at issue
in the Louisiana case of Beard v. Beard'87 in which the parents who had joint cus-
tody reached an impasse over where the child would attend kindergarten.' 88 The
court recognized the child's coming of school age as an adequate change of circum-
stances so as to defeat the spirit of joint custody, and placed primary custody with
the mother.'8 9
The Mississippi Supreme Court addressed a novel issue recently in Bubac v.
Boston, 90 In that case, the parents had been granted joint custody by a Kentucky
court, with the father having primary custody until such time that the mother
could establish a home for the children.91 During the period when the father had
primary custody, he attempted to transfer custody of the children, unilaterally to
his mother, who later refused to return the children to their mother.'92 The court
recognized the mother's right to the children under the previous order, and ex-
pressly held that the father could not "transfer his right to custody of the children to
whomever he selected. . . . This Court cannot accept such logic."" 3
While the concept of joint custody looks good on paper, it is generally unworka-
ble in practicality due to its immense potential for conflicts. It is a fallacy of the
court system to anticipate the long-term cooperation of ex-spouses on such a sensi-
tive issue as child rearing.
VI. CONCLUSION
In a child custody lawsuit, it is imperative that the successful litigator use every
available tool to present his client to the court as the more stable parent, who pro-
vides a safe and nurturing environment for the child. Further, it is crucial to instill
in the client the idea that the best interests of the child are paramount. In this
unique type of lawsuit, those best interests can often best be preserved through set-
183. 455 So. 2d 778 (Miss. 1984).
184. Id. at 780.
185. 572 So. 2d 841 (Miss. 1990).
186. Id. at 843.
187. 599 So. 2d 486 (La. Ct. App. 1992).
188. Id. at 488.
189. Id. at 489.
190.600 So. 2d 951 (Miss. 1992).
191. Id. at 953.
192. Id. at 953, 955-56.
193. Id. at 955-56.
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tement rather than through full blown litigation. Additionally a disposition is gen-
erally more economically feasible for everyone involved.
In any litigation the court is burdened with the herculean task of weighing evi-
dence, sorting exhibits, and determining the credibility of witnesses with the ulti-
mate aim of rendering a just decision. In a case involving the rights to a child, the
court's duty is magnified in that the force of that court's single decision will be felt,
not only by the parties, but by that child for a lifetime.

